

THE EUTHYDEMUS  
OF PLATO

WITH REVISED TEXT  
INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND INDICES

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HENRY FROWDE, M.A.  
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD  
LONDON, EDINBURGH  
NEW YORK

OXFORD  
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1905



## PREFACE

THIS edition of the *Euthydemus* is intended for the use of University Students and the Higher Forms of Public Schools. To such readers there will be little force in the objection made by some critics of a sterner mood that the dialogue is too amusing, too full of satirical humour and even broad comedy, to be worthy of so great a philosopher as Plato. On this character of the 'Literary Form' of the dialogue see the Introduction, § ii.

In revising the text I have made no new collation of manuscripts, but have depended on the critical apparatus of Schanz and the revision of the same by Burnet, except as to a few readings for which I have carefully inspected the phototype of the Codex Clarkianus in the Bodleian Library.

The only original emendations which I have ventured to introduce are 271 α γ καβ̄ ᾶ for κατὰ, and 286 θ γ Σὸ δ' ἐκέλευες; for οὐδὲ κελεύεις.

In attempting to determine the date of the *Euthydemus* and its relation to the *Phaedrus* I have derived most help from the Introductions to the latter dialogue by Stallbaum and Thompson, and from Lutoslawski's *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*.

My best thanks are due to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for allowing the work to be published under their auspices, and to the Secretary and other officials for much valuable assistance and unfailing kindness during the passage of the volume through the press.

OXFORD:  
November, 1904.

## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION :

- I. Argument of the Dialogue
- II. Literary Form
- III. The General Purpose
- IV. The Special Occasion
- V. Date of the Dialogue
- VI. Logical Principles and Fallacies
- VII. The Sophists
- VIII. Text

### TEXT OF EUTHYDEMUS

### NOTES ON THE TEXT

- I. INDEX OF GREEK WORDS
- II. INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

## INTRODUCTION

### I. CONTENTS.

THE *Euthydemus* is a conversation between Socrates and his old friend Crito, consisting chiefly of a highly dramatized narrative of a discussion in which Socrates himself had played a principal part, the other chief actor being the Sophist from whose name the dialogue takes its title.

The other persons taking part in the action are Dionysodorus, the elder brother of Euthydemus ; Cleinias, an ingenuous and handsome youth of noble birth, first cousin to the famous Alcibiades ; and Ctesiphon, an enthusiastic admirer of Cleinias, a high-spirited young gentleman of irascible temper and rough and ready speech, who has been previously introduced in the *Lysis* (204 C, 205 A, 206 C, D) as rallying his sentimental friend Hippothales with a boisterous kind of wit.

There are also present many pupils and admirers of the two Sophists, and on the other hand many young friends of Cleinias.

i. In the opening scene Socrates gives an account to Crito of the two Sophists with whom he had held a discussion in the Lyceum on the previous day. They were natives of Chios, who had migrated to Thurii, and being banished thence had spent many years in various parts of Greece, and had recently come to Athens as professional teachers of wisdom and virtue. The varied accomplishments which they had displayed on a former visit are extolled by Socrates with playful irony. He had never understood before what true pancratiasts were ; but these men were perfect in every kind of combat. They could teach men to fight in heavy armour with the weapons of actual war, or to arm themselves with speeches for the harder conflicts of the law-courts. They had now set the crown upon pancratiastic art by making themselves masters of the 'eristic philosophy,' an irresistible method of disputation by which every statement, true and false alike, could be refuted with

## INTRODUCTION

equal certainty. Let Crito come with Socrates to be taught these noble arts; it was not too late to learn, for the teachers themselves were old men, and had only learned this new system last year. If Socrates and Crito took their sons with them, they would, no doubt, be admitted as fellow pupils (271 A-272 D).

As Crito wishes to know what sort of wisdom he is to be taught, Socrates proceeds to describe what had occurred in the Lyceum. He had been sitting alone in the apodyterium, and was just rising up to go away when he was forbidden by the usual sign (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) to leave his seat. The two Sophists presently enter and walk up and down in the colonnade, followed by an admiring crowd of pupils. Cleinias, accompanied by Ctesippus and other friends, comes in and sits beside Socrates. On seeing this the Sophists approach, and seat themselves, Euthydemus beside Cleinias, and Diodorus on the other side of Socrates, who introduces them to Cleinias with high commendation of their military and forensic skill. But the brothers receive these compliments with rude contempt, for they are no longer proud of such minor accomplishments, but make the loftier boast of imparting virtue more perfectly and more quickly than any other men. 'The possessors of such a power, says Socrates, must be divine: forgive my irreverent speeches, and grant us an exhibition of this marvellous wisdom: we are all eager to learn, and let the first experiment be made on Cleinias, for whose advancement in wisdom and virtue we are all most anxious' (272 D-275 C).

ii. Before attempting to describe the next scene Socrates, like the poets (*Hom. II. ii. 484*), invokes the Muses and Mnemosyne to aid him in so great a task: cf. *Theaet.* 191 D.

Then comes the wonderful exhibition of the Sophists' skill in teaching virtue.

*Euthydemus.* Are those who learn the wise or the unwise (*οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*)?

*Cleinias.* The wise.

*Euthydemus.* Do they already know the things which they are learning?

*Cleinias.* No.

*Euthydemus.* Then the learners are the unwise (*ἀμαθεῖς*), not the wise, as you suppose.

## I. CONTENTS

The chorus of the Sophists' followers laugh and applaud; and before Cleinias has time to recover breath Dionysodorus takes him in hand.

'Which of the schoolboys learn the dictated lesson, the clever or the stupid (*οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*)?'—'The clever.'—'Then the wise (*οἱ σοφοὶ*) are the learners, not the unwise (*οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*), and your answer to Euthydemus was wrong.'

Amid shouts of applause Euthydemus returns to the attack.

'Do the boys learn (*μανθάνουσιν*) what they know (*ἐπίστανται*), or what they do not know?'—'What they do not know.'—'But they know the letters?'—'Yes.'—'And the letters make up the lesson?'—'Yes.'—'Then they learn what they know, and your answer was wrong.'

Upon this Diodorus again takes up the ball: 'To learn is to receive knowledge: to know is to have knowledge. The learners receive but have not knowledge: therefore they who do not know learn, not those who know' (275 C-277 C).

Cleinias is quite bewildered, and Socrates interposes to shield him from a third attack. The Sophists, he says, are only playing with him, and dancing round him like the Corybantes, and initiating him by these preparatory rites into the Sophistic mysteries. They are tripping him up with their verbal fallacies in order to teach him that a word may be used in more senses than one. But there has been enough of such play: let them now show Cleinias how to improve in wisdom and virtue; he will himself give an example of what he means in his own simple way (277 C-278 D).

All men desire to be happy, in other words to do well (*εὖ πράττειν*): to this end they count many good things necessary, riches, health, beauty, noble birth, power, honour. To these must be added temperance, justice, fortitude, wisdom, and good fortune. But good fortune is already included in wisdom. In the practice of every art, in playing the flute, in reading and writing, in navigation, in war, in medicine the wise are the fortunate, and he who has wisdom has no further need of fortune.

Moreover all those good things must be used, and used rightly, in order to make men happy; and to use them rightly there must be knowledge for a guide. Without it riches and strength and

## INTRODUCTION

power become even worse than useless, as giving wider opportunities for ill doing. In short all such things are in themselves neither good nor bad: wisdom alone is good, and folly bad, therefore get wisdom.

But how to get it? Can it be taught, or does it come spontaneously? Cleinias replies with youthful confidence, 'In my opinion it can be taught'; and Socrates is delighted to accept so readily a solution of the great question (278 E-282 D).

Socrates now invites either of the Sophists to discuss the same subject more scientifically, or to go on to show whether it is necessary to acquire every kind of knowledge, or only some one science that will suffice to make Cleinias wise and happy. Dionysodorus, after being assured that they truly and earnestly desire to have Cleinias made wise, argues that they wish him to be now what he is not, that is to be no longer what he now is, in fact to be destroyed. Worthy friends, to wish destruction to the boy!

'Destruction on your own head!' cries Ctesippus, 'for telling such an impious lie about us.'—'A lie!' says Euthydemus. 'Is it possible to tell a lie? By telling the thing of which you speak you tell a real thing; and he who tells the real thing tells the truth, and tells no lie. You can do nothing to what is not, you can only speak what is, that is, speak truth.'—'Yes, of course,' says Ctesippus, 'he speaks in a certain way of real things, but not as they really are.'—'What do you mean?' says Diodorus. 'Do any speak of things as they are?'—'Yes, gentlemen, and those who speak the truth.'—'Do good men then speak badly of what is bad?'—'Indeed they do speak very badly of bad men, and if you do not take care, they will speak badly of you.'—'And do they speak greatly of the great, and hotly of the hot?'—'Certainly, and speak frigidly of the frigid and their frigid arguments.'—'You are insolent, Ctesippus, insolent, I say.'—'Not so, but as a friend I advise you never to say so rudely in my presence that I wish destruction to my dearest friends' (282 D-284 E).

Socrates again interposes to keep the peace: 'Let us not quarrel over a word; if by "destruction" they mean making foolish and bad men wise and good, let them try the experiment on me, and boil me, if they please, as in Medea's cauldron.'—'Or they may flay me like Marsyas,' said Ctesippus, 'only let them make virtue, not

## I. CONTENTS

a bottle, out of my hide: but Dionysodorus must not call contradiction insolence.'

'Is contradiction possible?' said the Sophist. 'At all events you could not prove that you ever heard one person contradicting another.'—'That is true; but let us listen now whether I am proving it to you while Ctesippus is contradicting Dionysodorus' (see the note on the passage).

'Would you undertake to argue this? We should not contradict each other at all, if we both knew the right definition (*λόγον*) of each thing; but when neither knows the right definition, then we should contradict each other, or in this case neither would speak of the thing at all. So when I give the right definition and you some other, you do not speak of the thing itself at all, and, if you do not speak, you cannot contradict' (284 E-286 B).

Ctesippus kept silence, but Socrates said that this argument was as old as Protagoras or older, and had a wonderful way of tripping up the speaker himself as well as others. 'But you can best tell us the truth about it. Is it impossible to speak or even think what is false? Is there no such thing as ignorance, or an ignorant man? Do you really mean this?'—'Refute me if you can,' said Dionysodorus.—'Is refutation possible, if according to your argument no one speaks what is false?'—'No, it is not,' said Euthydemus.—'Neither then did I bid you refute me,' said Dionysodorus.—'Was it you then that bade me, Euthydemus: for I do not clearly understand these subtleties. However, I am going to ask perhaps a stupid question: If it is impossible to contradict, to speak or even think what is false, to be ignorant or in error, pray what are you come to teach?' (285 A-287 A).

Dionysodorus tries to evade this troublesome question: 'Why go back to former arguments? Can you make nothing of the present?'—'They are very difficult,' says Socrates, 'for what does this last phrase, "make nothing of them," mean (*νοεῖ*), except that I cannot "refute" them?'

Dionysodorus has heard enough of that word 'refute' (286 E), and insists on passing to a new question: 'Can a mere lifeless word "mean" anything?'—'It was my stupidity,' says Socrates; 'but was I right or wrong? If I was right, you cannot "refute" me: and if I was wrong, you cannot be right in saying that error

## INTRODUCTION

is impossible (287 A). This is not going back to the past: for your present argument can only trip one up and then itself fall' (287 A-288 A).

Ctesippus begins again to jeer at the Sophists, but is checked by Socrates: 'They are not yet in earnest, but are playing tricks like Proteus, and must be held fast till they show themselves in their true form.' He will give them another example of the sort of teaching which he wishes them to impart, by continuing his argument with Cleinias.

It was agreed (282 D 1) that philosophy or the acquisition of knowledge is necessary to make men happy. But what kind of knowledge? Such as teaches them to make the right use of all other acquirements and advantages. Not the knowledge of healing or money-making, nor even a knowledge that would make us immortal without teaching us to use immortality aright: not the art of the speech-maker, sublime and inspired though it sometimes appears; for some know not how to use the speeches they have themselves made, and after all it is only a kind of charm for fascinating judges and assemblies. Is it then the strategic art that makes men happy?—No, says Cleinias, that is only a kind of man-hunting; and hunters and fishermen give over what they catch to cooks, and geometers and astronomers give their discoveries to dialecticians to make use of them.

iii. At this point the narrative of Socrates is interrupted by Crito, who is astonished that one so young as Cleinias should be so wise. A long conversation follows, in which Socrates explains that even the kingly art is found wanting, because it does not impart wisdom or knowledge, and its claim is only an empty boast like  $\delta \Delta\iota\delta\varsigma \text{ Κόρινθος}$  (290 E-293 A).

iv. Socrates being thus unable, as he pretends, to find the kind of knowledge that will make men happy entreats the Sophists to be serious and rescue them from their difficulty. Euthydemus boldly undertakes to prove that Socrates already possesses the knowledge of which he is in search: he knows something, nay many things, therefore he knows everything; for he cannot be both knowing and not knowing.

'Then you two also,' says Socrates, 'know everything.'—'Yes,' says Dionysodorus, 'and all men know all things, if they know

## I. CONTENTS

one.'—'Good heavens!—for now I see you are in earnest—do you really know all things, such as carpentering, shoemaking, astronomy, and the number of the sands?'—'Of course we do.' At this Ctesippus bursts in with an impudent jibe: 'Does each of them know how many teeth the other has?' Some lively bantering follows, and then Euthydemus, still maintaining that Socrates, as well as themselves, knows all things, insists on having his questions answered categorically, 'Yes' or 'No,' without any exception or limitation, and thus proves to his own satisfaction that Socrates knew all things even before he was born or begotten, and before the earth and the heaven were made (293 A-296 D).

Socrates now turns their own mode of argument against them: 'Do I, or do I not, know that the good are unjust?'—'Yes,' says Euthydemus. 'You know that they are not unjust.'—'But that is not what I ask. How do I know that they *are* unjust?'—'You do not know it at all,' says Dionysodorus; but he is reprovved by Euthydemus for spoiling the argument, by admitting that Socrates is at the same time knowing and not knowing.

'Must not your brother, who knows all things, be right?'—'Am I his brother?' says Dionysodorus, trying again to change the argument. To this Socrates replies: 'I cannot fight two at once; even Hercules called his nephew Iolaus to help him.'—'Was Iolaus any more Hercules' nephew than yours?'—'As you will not let Euthydemus answer my question, I must, I suppose, answer yours: Iolaus was Hercules' nephew, not mine at all, not being the son of my brother Patrocles.'—'Is Patrocles your brother?'—'Yes, on the mother's side, not on the father's.'—'Then he both is and is not your brother.'—'Not on the father's side: Chaeredemus was his father, Sophroniscus mine.'—'Then Chaeredemus, being different from a father, was not a father; and so Sophroniscus, in like manner being different from a father, was not a father: so you, Socrates, had no father' (296 D-298 B).

This style of argument suits Ctesippus: 'Your father, you say, is also my father, and father of all, both men and beasts; you therefore are the brother of gudgeons and puppies and little pigs.'—'So are you,' says Dionysodorus: 'your dog is a father of puppies, and he is yours; therefore he is your father, and you are the puppies' brother. When you beat your dog, you beat your own

## INTRODUCTION

father.'—'I would much rather beat your father for begetting such wise sons,' replies Ctesippus.

Then follows an argument with Euthydemus about having too much of a good thing: a whole cartload of hellebore would be too much for a sick man, unless he were as big as the statue at Delphi; but one shield and spear would not be enough for a Geryon or Briareus (298 B-299 C).

Diodorus here comes to his brother's aid: 'Gold you admit is good; then the happiest man must be one who has most gold: gold in his stomach, and skull, and both eyes.'—'Yes, indeed,' said Ctesippus, turning to Euthydemus, 'they say that among the Scythians the happiest and bravest men have much gold in their own skulls, and drink out of their own skulls, and holding their own heads in their hands, see into the inside.'

Euthydemus, catching at the word 'see,' carries on the argument by quibbling about the double meaning of *δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν*, 'able to see,' or 'able to be seen,' of *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, and *λέγοντα σιγᾶν*, until Ctesippus asks, 'Do all things speak, or all keep silence?'—'Neither and both,' cries Dionysodorus; and Ctesippus with a loud laugh declares that by this 'both' he has ruined his argument and is beaten and done for (*ἀπόλωλε* alluding perhaps to 283 D, E).

Cleinias laughs with delight, and Ctesippus swells with pride. 'Why do you laugh,' says Socrates, 'at things so important and beautiful?'—'Are beautiful things different from beauty or the same?' asks Dionysodorus. Socrates pretends to be puzzled and sorry to have spoken, but answers that they are different from beauty itself, though some beauty is present with each.—'Then if an ox be present with you, you are an ox, and because I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?'—'Heaven forbid,' said Socrates.—'But in what way must one thing be present to another in order that this other may be other (than it was)?'—'Do you doubt about that?'—'Of course I doubt about what is not possible.'—'Is not the same same, and the other other? Even a child could not doubt that the other is other.' (Socrates here confounds the Sophist by his own device of using 'other' in different senses; see the note on 301 B 1). 'This point, Dionysodorus, you missed on purpose, but in other respects your dialectic is excellent.'

## I. CONTENTS

Thus encouraged Dionysodorus proceeds in his own fashion to prove the propriety of boiling the cook, smiting the smith, and making pots of the potter. Further he makes Socrates admit that he may give, or sell, or slay his own animals, and that since his gods Zeus, Apollo, or Athene having souls are animals, he may give, sell, or slay them. Socrates is struck dumb, but Ctesippus cries 'Bravo Hercules, what a fine argument!' 'Is "Bravo Hercules," or "Hercules Bravo"?'—'O Poseidon, what clever arguments! I give up,' says Ctesippus; 'they are irresistible.'

Not only are the admirers of Euthydemus bursting with delight, but the very columns of the portico seem to ring with laughter and applause. Socrates, as if enchanted by the Sophists' wisdom, extols ironically their utter disregard of other men's opinions, who would be ashamed to conquer by such arguments, and silyly adds that by denying all predication (301 B 3), and declaring that nothing is either beautiful, or good, or white, they sew up other men's mouths and their own also, a delightful result that does away all offence. But the most marvellous thing is that they can teach others so quickly, as was seen when Ctesippus beat them with their own weapons. So they must not exhibit their skill in public, but only argue with each other alone, or with those who will pay them: such rare wisdom is of too great price to be made as common as water; but he begs them to receive him and Cleinias as pupils (303 B-304 B).

v. Having ended his narrative of the discussion with the Sophists Socrates playfully invites Crito to become his fellow-pupil. But Crito declines the proposal, and tells how he had met a certain person who had heard the discussion, and criticized it as an unworthy fuss about worthless matters. Philosophy itself he said was good for nothing, and Crito would have been ashamed if he had heard how Socrates gave himself up to the Sophists. Socrates ascertains that the critic was no orator, but one of the speech-writers who being neither philosophers nor statesmen, but halfway between the two, tried to disparage real philosophers as their only rivals in wisdom, and shrank from all personal discussion lest they might be worsted by the fallacious tricks of the Sophists, which they supposed to be practised by the philosophers also. Crito might well be afraid of entrusting the education of his sons to

## INTRODUCTION

impostors such as the Sophists, but let him satisfy himself as to the value of true philosophy, and then both study and practise it himself, and encourage his sons to do the same (304 B-307 C).

### II. THE LITERARY FORM.

In the foregoing sketch of the contents of the dialogue we see that its general form and arrangement are clearly marked.

The main subject is the narration by Socrates of a discussion between himself and the Sophists; but this is set in the frame of a conversation between Socrates and Crito, which both forms the introduction (271 A-272 D), and is resumed in the middle (290 E-293 A) and at the end of the discussion (304 B-the end).

Apart from this conversation the narrative of the discussion itself may be regarded as a drama in five scenes distinguished by the different characters who speak in each. Cf. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. p. 258.

Sc. 1. Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias, Socrates (272 E-277 C).

Sc. 2. Socrates, Cleinias (277 D-282 E).

Sc. 3. Dionysodorus, Socrates, Ctesippus, Euthydemus (283 A-288 B).

Sc. 4. Socrates, Cleinias (288 B-290 D).

Sc. 5. Euthydemus, Socrates, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus (293 D-304 B).

This dramatic form is more prominent in the *Euthydemus* than in any other of the Platonic dialogues, and from the allusions to a chorus and choric dancing in 276 B and 277 D we may infer that it was consciously adopted by Plato in order to give the most vivid expression to the contrast between the methods of argument practised by Socrates and the Sophists. This peculiar character of the dialogue has been noticed by nearly every critic, and particularly by Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*, ii. 24: 'We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should call "Genteel Comedy" than a philosophical exposition. Thus the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing

## II. LITERARY FORM

less than a *dramatic satire*, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the Sophistic professors, and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle.'

But it is strange, as Schleiermacher remarks in his Introduction, 'that attention has always been exclusively given to this sophisticated dramatizing, when to every reader the dialogue presents more important matter, a general philosophical bearing, and a visible reference to other Platonic writings.' It is not in the depth of the arguments employed, but in the liveliness of the action and the incisive force of the satire that the excellence of Plato's work is in this case to be recognized.

If therefore we ever find the *Euthydemus* regarded as little better than a farce and quite unworthy of the genius of Plato, we may wonder whether the critic has quite appreciated the subtle irony, and detected the important truths that underlie the playful language. Socrates is in fact represented throughout as giving full play to his satirical humour, and fooling the Sophists to the top of their bent by pretending to be overpowered by their arguments, to marvel at their supernatural wisdom, and even to address them as absolutely divine (273 E, 296 D). As Euthydemus and his brother are represented in the dialogue as old men, it is not likely that they were still living at the time when Plato wrote; but it is evident that they were men of a very inferior stamp, both socially and mentally, to the greater Sophists such as Protagoras or Gorgias, and were chosen to represent the degenerate class on whom the magnificent Isocrates pours such unmitigated contempt in his oration *Against the Sophists*, 291 D. It was thus easier for Plato to make the contrast between them and Socrates the more striking. Dionysodorus in particular is represented as even more shallow and ignorant than his brother (297 A): his coarse insolence and stupid attempts at wit (283 D, 297 D) serve to justify the introduction on the other side of such a character as Ctesippus. Thus the anger of Plato, guided by his dramatic instinct, finds an outlet in the quarrels of these minor characters for the unsparing sarcasm and vehement reproaches which serve as a foil to the delicate satire and ironical compliments of Socrates. We can hardly fail to be reminded how often the broadest farce is allowed to alternate with the most tragic and pathetic scenes in Shakespeare.

## INTRODUCTION

### III. THE GENERAL PURPOSE.

It is evident from the foregoing sketch of the contents, and is in fact universally admitted, that the main purpose of the *Euthydemus* is 'to represent the opposition of Socratic and Sophistic views with regard to their value in the training and education of youth' (Zeller, *Plato*, ch. ii, note 94).

'The peculiar point of view of the *Euthydemus* was long since rightly indicated by Welcker. . . . If we assume that Plato is here . . . attacking a corrupt kind of education, which though essentially worthless is yet through the approval of the multitude not unimportant for the moment, and that its chief excellence is therefore to be looked for not in the depth of the counter arguments but in the vigour of the action and satirical description, all agrees well under this point of view' (Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* ii. 278). 'The vocation of philosophy to be the true educator of youth is vindicated in opposition to sophistry ("Scheinweisheit") which would usurp its place, and this through the representation of each in action' (ibid. 276 fin.).

This purpose is clearly indicated in the case of Cleinias by the desire of his friends that he should be persuaded to pursue the study of philosophy and of virtue (275 A 6), and again at the end of the dialogue in the anxiety of Crito about the education of his sons (306 D 2).

The professed aim of the two systems of education thus contrasted is the same, namely to promote the study of wisdom and virtue in all men, and especially in the young (273 D 8, 275 A 1, 278 D 3, 282 D 3). But in the *methods* adopted on either side, and in the *results* attained, there is the most striking contrast.

The Sophists employ the commonest logical fallacies and the most trifling verbal quibbles (275 D 3-277 C 7), and the result is that they fully succeed in reducing the mind of an intelligent and ingenuous youth to utter confusion, and expose him to the vulgar ridicule of their own disciples (276 B, D), while Ctesippus in revenge turns their own weapons against them with well-deserved flouts and jeers (284 E, 288 B).

In the strongest possible contrast to this exhibition of Sophistic folly Plato presents an example of true Socratic teaching.

### III. THE GENERAL PURPOSE

Its aim is to guide and encourage Cleinias in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue (278 D). The method adopted is to propose for consideration a serious and important subject, the universal desire for happiness. First there is an enumeration of the good things on which happiness is supposed to depend, and then it is shown by a scientific process of analysis—the division of concepts—that these things contribute to happiness only when rightly used, under the guidance of knowledge, which does not come to a man by nature or accident, but by teaching and careful study (282 D).

In continuation (288 D) several kinds of special knowledge, rhetoric, strategy, and government, are found incapable of making men virtuous and happy, the result, so far as Cleinias is concerned, being that he takes part in the discussion with a growing intelligence that excites the admiration of Crito (290 E), while the general inference that philosophy alone can make men wise and good, though clearly indicated, is not expressed in this dialogue but left for further consideration (292 E).

In the renewal of the discussion the contrast between this example of Socratic teaching and that of the Sophists is made more glaring by a series of captious questions, quibbling answers, fallacies and paradoxes, which will be noticed more fully in a later section. Meanwhile it will be sufficient to quote an admirable description of the 'Eristic' art of disputation as practised by the Sophists, and illustrated in the *Euthydemus*, from Zeller's *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, ii. 462, Eng. Tr.: 'We get a vivid picture of the Sophistic art of disputation, as it was constituted in later times, in Plato's dialogue of *Euthydemus*, and in Aristotle's *Treatise on Fallacies*; and though we must not forget that the one is a satire written with all poetic freedom, and the other a universal theory which there is no reason to restrict to the Sophists in the narrower sense or to anything historical, yet the harmony of these descriptions one with the other, and with other accounts, shows that we are justified in applying them in all their essential features to the Sophistic teaching. What they tell us is certainly not much to its advantage. The Eristics were not concerned about any scientific result; their object was to involve their adversary or interlocutor in confusion and difficulties from which he could find no way of escape, so that every answer that he gave seemed incorrect': ibid.

## INTRODUCTION

NOTE. 'The ἀφύκτα ἐρωτήματα of which the Sophist boasts, *Euthyd.* 275 E, 276 E.'

Ibid. 463. 'If a discussion is uncomfortable to the Sophist, he evades it<sup>1</sup>; if an answer is desired of him, he insists on asking questions<sup>2</sup>; if any one tries to escape from ambiguous questions by closer definition, he demands "Yes" or "No"<sup>3</sup>; if he thinks his adversary knows of an answer, he begins by deprecating all that can possibly be said on that side<sup>4</sup>; if he is accused of contradicting himself, he protests against bringing forward things that are done with long ago<sup>5</sup>. If he has no other resource, he stupefies his adversary with speeches the absurdity of which precludes any reply<sup>6</sup>.'

### IV. THE SPECIAL OCCASION.

Besides the general purpose of vindicating the claims of true science in the education of the young, and of distinguishing the Socratic teaching from that of the Sophists, there is a certain character of the dialogue that calls for further explanation. It is evident from the whole tone and temper of the discussion, and especially of the final conversation between Socrates and Crito, that it was written in a mood of unusual irritation due to some more personal cause than the standing opposition between Plato and the Sophists. It is generally supposed that this angry feeling had been roused by the envious attacks of rival teachers, and many attempts have been made to identify the persons whose doctrines are criticized or caricatured both in the body of the dialogue and in the portrait of the λογογράφος in 305 C.

The name of Lysias is naturally one of the first to occur to any one who thinks of the unfriendly feeling between him and Plato. Athenaeus, in one of his bitter attacks upon Plato (xiii. 611), quotes part of a speech of Lysias in order to take down 'the arrogance (βρῆνθος) of the philosophers.' The speech was written for the

<sup>1</sup> *Euthyd.* 287 B sqq., 297 B, 299 A, etc.

<sup>2</sup> 287 B sq., 295 B sqq.

<sup>3</sup> 295 E sq., 297 D sqq.

<sup>4</sup> Thrasymachus in Plato, *Rep.* i. 336 C, 337 A.

<sup>5</sup> This is done with the most delightful naïveté in *Euthyd.* 287 B.

<sup>6</sup> *Euthyd.* 293 D, 298 D, 303 A.

## IV. THE SPECIAL OCCASION

prosecution of Aeschines Socraticus, whom Lysias charges with crimes especially disgraceful to one 'who had been a disciple of Socrates, and talked so finely about justice and virtue.' Cf. *Ast. Lex. Plat.* 'Σοφιστής a Lysia dictus est Plato una cum Aeschine Socratico, ap. Aristid. c. Plat. ii.' In the oration of Aristides, p. 192, he speaks of Plato as τῶν Ῥητόρων πατέρα καὶ διδάσκαλον (*Fabric. Bibl. Gr.* vol. iv. 386).

Plato's feeling towards Lysias is sufficiently evident in the *Phaedrus*; but in the description of the λογογράφος at the end of the *Euthydemus* there is one feature which shows that it cannot be meant for him. For 'Lysias did on one memorable occasion plead his own cause. The excellent speech Κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους was delivered by him during his brief tenure of the Athenian franchise' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, 181, n. 8): cf. K. O. Müller, *Lit. of Ancient Greece*, 496.

Schleiermacher, in his introduction to the dialogue, suggests that Antisthenes was one of the persons whom Plato assails under the names of the less important Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.

Antisthenes (*circ.* 445-371 B.C.) was at first a pupil of Gorgias, but afterwards a devoted disciple and friend of Socrates, at whose death he was present (*Phaed.* 59 B). In imitation of the self-denial and patient endurance of Socrates, Antisthenes became the founder of the Cynic sect (*Diog. Laert.* vi. 2). The many anecdotes recorded of him contain abundant evidence of the ill-feeling which existed between him and Plato. Having been told that Plato spoke ill of him, 'It is a kinglike fate,' he said, 'to do good and to be evil spoken of.' On meeting Plato, who had been sick, 'I see,' said Antisthenes, 'you have got rid of your bile, but not of your conceit.'

Another anecdote preserved by Diogenes Laertius (iii. 35) not only suggests a cause for this ill-will, but also indicates a direct connexion between Antisthenes and a passage in our dialogue. Plato being once invited by Antisthenes to hear him read a philosophic treatise inquired what the subject was to be, and, when told that it was an argument to prove the non-existence of contradiction (περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν), replied, 'How then do you write about it, since it is non-existent?' The argument, as Plato showed, can

## INTRODUCTION

be turned round (*περιτρέπεται*), for *μη εἶναι* is itself a contradiction. Hereupon Antisthenes wrote a dialogue against Plato, merely changing the name to Satho.

In *Euthydemus* 285 D 7-286 B 6 there is an unmistakable allusion to this paradoxical doctrine of Antisthenes, which is also mentioned by Aristotle, *Τοφ.* i. 11, 4, and again *Μεταφ.* iv. 29, 4 'Ο δὲ ψευδῆς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος. Διὸ Ἀντισθένης φέρο εὐθὺς μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. The meaning of Aristotle in this passage is well explained by Zeller (Part i, *Outlines*, Eng. Tr. p. 118): 'In passionate contradiction to the Platonic ideas he (Antisthenes) allowed the individual being only to exist, and hence demanded that everything should receive its own name (the *οἰκείος λόγος*) and no other. From this he deduced the conclusion (apparently after the pattern of Gorgias) that no subject can receive a predicate of a different nature. He rejected, therefore, definition by characteristic marks; only for what was composite would he allow an enumeration of its constituent parts. What was simple might be explained by comparison with something else, but it could not be defined. With Protagoras he maintained that no man could contradict himself, for if he said what was different, he was speaking of different things. Thus he gave a thoroughly Sophistic turn to the Socratic philosophy of concepts.' Compare Zeller, *Socrates*, chap. xiii Cynic Logic; Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 284, who argues that the opposition between the doctrines of Antisthenes and Plato, the paradoxical form and inconsistency ('Erfolglosigkeit') in the philosophy of Antisthenes, and the ludicrous applications which might be made of his dogmas, render it quite conceivable that Plato reckoned him among the Sophists, and that he actually did so is placed beyond doubt by such passages as 283 E, 285 E.

The same opinion is expressed by Zeller (*Plato*, p. 84, note 94), who writes that in the exposition of his subject 'Plato had to do, not merely with the views of the elder Sophists and their later developments, but also . . . with Antisthenes, who seemed to him in true Sophistic fashion to destroy all possibility of cognition, to confuse Socratic with Sophistic views and thereby spoil them.'

We can well believe therefore that the satire of the *Euthydemus* was in certain passages directed against Antisthenes; but his

## IV. THE SPECIAL OCCASION

character does not so fully correspond to the particular description in 304 D as to justify the opinion that he was the rhetorician and speech-writer there described.

Winckelmann (*Proleg.* xxxiv) thinks that the description of the *λογογράφος* is intended for Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, the Sophist who argues so vehemently against Socrates on the nature of justice in the first book of the Republic. In the *Phaedrus* he is mentioned (261 C) as a leading Sophist with Gorgias and Theodorus, and in 266 C as a teacher of rhetoric to all who would pay for it (*οἱ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν*). Again in *Phaedr.* 267 C he is described as a master of the art of pathetic commonplace: for 'the "sorrows of a poor old man" no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant' (Jowett). In the same passage the words immediately following, *ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένους ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη*, evidently point to some boastful expressions of Thrasymachus, to which there seems to be an allusion in *Euthydem.* 290 A ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπωδῶν (τέχνη), ἔχεών τε . . . καὶ νόσων κήλησις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησις τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα. Not less striking is the similarity between the preceding passage of *Euthydemus* and Plat. *Pol.* 358 B Θρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶταίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡς περ ὄφεις κληθῆναι.

It thus seems highly probable that Thrasymachus is alluded to in *Euthydem.* 290 A; but when Winckelmann tries to prove that he is the *λογογράφος* referred to in the close of the dialogue, we find that the testimony to which he appeals is quite inadequate to the conclusion. In Cic., *De Orat.* iii. 16, Thrasymachus is named among the rhetoricians 'qui minus ipsi in republica versarentur, sed huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates.' Neither here nor in Quintilian, *Inst. Orator.* iii. 1 'Communes locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus et Thrasymachus,' is there the slightest indication of his having written speeches for others to deliver in the law-courts, and the absence of a feature which is so prominent in the description in 304 D, 305 B, C, makes it impossible to suppose that he is the person meant.

We have therefore still to inquire who is the individual, if any, there described. In the statement of Crito, 304 E 5, that he is quoting the very words this person used (*οὕτως γὰρ πῶς καὶ εἶπε*

## INTRODUCTION

τοῖς ὀνόμασι) there is 'an intimation,' says Thompson, p. 181, 'that some one in particular is meant.' And the *παρονομασία*, ἀξίω ἀναξίαν, and general style of the quotation, may probably be meant to imitate the affected language of Isocrates. Certainly the description which follows seems to correspond with his character as clearly displayed in his writings.

(i) It is almost impossible to open any page of his extant orations without finding abundant evidence that he was ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός (*Euthyd.* 304 D), one of those who οἴονται εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς (305 C). A single example must suffice, taken from the *Panegyrica* (43 D), an oration published in 380 B.C., when Isocrates was fifty-five years old: 'Ἐγὼ δ' ἦν μὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίως εἶπω καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου μὴ μόνον τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν διατριφθέντος ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντος οὗ βεβίωκα, παρακελεύομαι μηδεμίαν μοι συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καταγελάειν καὶ καταφρονεῖν' οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἀξίός εἰμι πάσχειν, εἶπερ μηδὲν τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων οὕτω μεγάλας ποιούμαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις.

(ii) The next trait, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν (304 D, 305 B), is proved to be true of Isocrates by the fact that several of such speeches are included in his remaining works. But in his latter years he was very sore at being reminded of his former occupation: 'For I know that some of the Sophists speak ill of my occupation, and say that it has to do with writing speeches for the law-courts, and in this they act just as if one should dare to call Pheidias who built the temple of Athena a doll-maker (*κοροπλάθον*), or say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius practised the same art as the sign-painters: nevertheless I have never yet taken revenge for this their detraction' (*Antidosis*, 310 B).

(iii) The sentence *ρήτωρ τις, ἢ τῶν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται*; and "Ἡκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία, ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πάποθ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι (*Euthyd.* 305 B-C) point evidently at Isocrates, who from timidity and weakness of health always shrank from appearing in person in any public assembly or court (*Isocr. Panathen.* 234 D). Cf. *Antid.* 318A 'Ἐμὲ δ' οὐδεὶς πάποθ' ἐώρακεν οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς συνεδρίοις οὐτε περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐτε πρὸς τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ἀπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν.

## IV. THE SPECIAL OCCASION

Plutarch in the *Life of Isocrates*, *Mor.* 837 A, says that the only speech he ever delivered in public was this, the *De Antidosis*, which we know was not composed till 355 B.C., when he was in his eighty-second year, long after the incident to which it refers: in fact Isocrates himself explains that it was only intended to show what his manner of life had been, and how he might have pleaded in excusing himself from undertaking the trierarchy, which he had actually accepted.

(iv) The next feature in the description of the unnamed writer of speeches is thoroughly characteristic of Isocrates. Οἱδοὶ γὰρ εἰσι μὲν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὗς ἔφη Πρὸδικος μεθύρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ (*Euthyd.* 305 C). Σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγούνται εἶναι πάνυ εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου· μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει (*ibid.* 305 D).

In these passages 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*, as one in whose genius ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 181).

We may add that the two passages exactly summarize the meaning of a long passage in the *De Antidosis*, 276-290, in which Isocrates, after protesting against the Platonic philosophy (τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινῶν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί) proceeds to say σοφούς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν.

'The finishing touch in the picture—(v) ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγῶνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν—agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the *Antidosis*' (Thompson, *ibid.*). See especially *Antid.* 162 τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν . . . ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδῶ νομίσας εἶναι τούτου ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων. The expression καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν and the synonymous phrase ἀπολέλυκα τοῦ πράγματος (*Antid.* 208) both refer to the enormous payments which Isocrates received for his teaching and his speeches. That he was the person to whom this description was meant to apply will be made even more evident when we come to examine a passage in which he is mentioned by name at the close of the *Phaedrus*. 'In fact the combination of a smattering of philosophy, a measure of political knowledge, great talent as

## INTRODUCTION

a writer of forensic speeches, and a boundless and intolerant vanity, is one which we find in the writings of Isocrates and in no others of that epoch' (Thompson, p. 182).

'No one will doubt any more that the episode at the end of the dialogue is aimed against Isocrates' (Sudhaus, *Rhein. Mus.* xlv. 52). 'Hunc (Isocratem) esse anonymum de quo ibi sermo est, hodie inter omnes constat' (F. Susemihl, *De Plat. Phaedro et Isocr. c. Sophistas oratione*, p. xi).

### V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE.

'The date of the *Euthydemus* we have absolutely no means of determining, and, if we set aside tradition, that of the *Phaedrus* may be said perhaps to be equally uncertain' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, Appendix ii. 183).

After such a pronouncement from the late Master of Trinity it may appear presumptuous even to try to determine the approximate dates of the two dialogues, and their mutual relation. But the attempt, I believe, is not hopeless, and in any case can hardly fail to be instructive. Several of Dr. Thompson's own remarks seem to point to what we believe to be the right conclusion.

We have seen reason to believe that Isocrates, though not mentioned by name in the *Euthydemus*, is the person indicated by the description of the clever speech-writer (*λογογράφος*) at the end of the dialogue.

In the *Phaedrus* Isocrates is mentioned by name in a passage which we shall have to examine carefully in its bearing upon the connexion between the two Platonic dialogues and the relation of each to the oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*. Before entering upon this inquiry it is desirable to draw particular attention to the fact that the three works are all concerned with the merits and faults of rival methods of education as practised by the teachers of rhetoric, by the Sophists, and by Socrates and his followers.

We begin with the *Phaedrus*.

The question concerning the date of this dialogue is difficult and much disputed. The oldest opinion, dating from the third century after Christ, is the tradition mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in the *Life of Plato*, iii. 25 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον' καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιῶδές τι τὸ πρόβλημα. From the first scholion on

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

the *Phaedrus* we learn that the tradition was repeated in the fifth century by Olympiodorus, the master of Proclus: the notion that it was founded by Diogenes on the authority of Euphorion (c. 240 B.C.), Panaetius (c. 143 B.C.) arose from a corrupt reading in Diog. Laer. λόγον, corrected by Cobet to λόγος. Cf. Thompson, *Phaedrus*, xxiii. H. Usener, *Abfassungszeit des platonischen Phaidros*, assigns the dialogue to the first half of 402 B.C., partly, as it seems, on the ground of the tradition, and partly upon the erroneous notion of Spengel, that the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* of Isocrates was written as much as fifty years before the *Ἀντιδοσις*, on which see p. 32 below.

A comparison of the contents and character of the *Phaedrus* with those of the dialogues known to have been written before or soon after the death of Socrates, B.C. 399, shows beyond all question that so mature a work could not possibly have been written by so young a man as Plato was at the still earlier date to which the 'tradition' would assign it. 'When Socrates died, the philosophical education of Plato had but completed its first stage. The acquaintance with other more ambitious systems which his travels enabled him to acquire or to perfect, though it never disturbed his reverence for the teacher of his youth, greatly enlarged his views of philosophy and the philosophic calling' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 154).

On the other hand a very much later date is proposed by Lutoslowski, who adopts (p. 352) a short and easy method of solving the difficulty. 'Thompson has made it evident to the attentive reader of the four dissertations accompanying his edition of the *Phaedrus* (Introduction and three Appendices) that this dialogue was written after the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, that is after 380; and before the death of Lysias, that is before 378. This is such an exact determination of date as is possible only for a very few Platonic dialogues.'

Every student of Plato would have reason to be grateful indeed to the author of this discovery, if it were true. But unfortunately it is based upon a misapprehension of Dr. Thompson's meaning; in a note on p. 178 of his edition he compares *Phaedr.* 167 A with *Isocr. Panegyricus*, § 8, and remarks that 'Plato jeeringly attributes this boast to Tisias and Gorgias: Isocrates adopts it as his own in perfect seriousness. The date of the *Panegyricus* is B.C. 380.'

This does not mean that the *Panegyricus* was written before the

## INTRODUCTION

*Phaedrus*, but on the contrary that Isocrates seriously appropriates what Plato has previously held up to ridicule. That Isocrates was quite capable of doing this will appear in another instance presently: see p. 31.

Lutoslawski, however, adds a more important remark: 'The same argument has been independently and with far greater assurance produced by Teichmüller in 1881 (*Literarische Fehden*, vol. i. pp. 57-82), and has never been refuted.'

Teichmüller's long argument on *The Phaedrus of Plato and the Panegyricus of Isocrates* (*Lit. Fehd.* i. 3) is summarized by Lutoslawski, p. 348. It is based upon several fundamental errors.

(1) He misunderstands the ironical nature of the prophecy concerning Isocrates in *Phaedrus* 279, on which see p. 26 below.

(2) In particular he misapplies the words *τοὺς λόγους οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ*, referring them to the time at which Plato wrote instead of the *scenic date* at which Socrates speaks.

(3) He makes the same mistake as Lutoslawski on the relation between the parallel passages *Phaedr.* 167 A and *Panegyricus*. § 8.

(4) He fails to notice the statement in the *Life of Isocrates* (Plut. ii. 837 F), that 'in composing the *Panegyricus* he spent ten years, and some say fifteen.' Cf. Quintil. *Inst. Orator.* x. 5: 'Panegyricum Isocratis, qui parcissime, decem annis dicunt elaboratum.'

If we adopt this 'most moderate' statement, it is still evident that the passage *Panegyricus*. § 8 may have been written at any time between 390 and 380 B.C., the date of publication, and could therefore afford no closer criterion of the relative date of the passage in the *Phaedrus*.

For more trustworthy evidence we must have recourse to an examination of the contents and purpose of the *Phaedrus* itself, and of any apparent allusions to it in other dialogues of Plato or Isocrates.

During the ten or eleven years that followed the death of Socrates (399 B.C.) Plato had written and studied and taught and travelled much. In the course of his travels there had been many opportunities for personal intercourse with the leaders of the chief schools of philosophy; at Megara with Euclides, at Cyrene with Aristippus, at Tarentum with Archytas and other Pythagoreans, at Velia with the Eleatics, and in Sicily with the Sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Corax, Tisias, and Gorgias.

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

On his return to Athens in 388 B.C. with this enlarged knowledge of the existing schools of philosophy, and with the principles of his own system more clearly defined and confirmed by comparison with others, Plato was fully prepared to take a leading part in education as a public teacher of philosophy. Accordingly in the year 387 B.C. he opened his famous school in the Academy.

In Athens at this time the field of education was chiefly occupied by two classes of teachers, both as bitterly opposed to Plato as they were to each other. His old enemies the Eristic Sophists had sunk to the lowest depths of chicanery and imposture, 'their only care being to make money from the young,' *Isocr. Hel. Encom.* 209 B, while 'they put so low a value on all the virtue and happiness which they professed to impart, that they were not ashamed to accept so little as three or four minae in payment,' *Adv. Sophist.* 291 D.

Isocrates himself was not less eager to make money, but on a far grander scale, and by more magnificent professions. From the time of Pericles oratory had been the ruling power in the state, and though its influence over the passions of the democracy had too often led to crime and disaster, it was still the favourite study of all young men whose wealth and ambition prompted them to seek power and fame in the arena of politics. Isocrates was their most popular and successful teacher: in politics his only moral standard was utility, and persuasion, not truth, the end and aim of his rhetorical art.

With the Sophists Plato had already dealt in several of his earlier dialogues, and was to deal with them again even more severely at a later period. His present purpose, carried out in the *Phaedrus*, was to expose the faults of the popular system of education founded upon a shallow rhetoric, and to show the superiority of a new dialectic based upon truer principles both of science and morality. The scene was laid in the lifetime of Socrates, and was to be the mouthpiece of a philosophy which, however enlarged and ennobled by the genius of Plato, was still faithful to the teaching of his master.

'For the purpose of a discussion on rhetoric as an instrument of education, Plato had to select a speech as an example to illustrate his views' (Lutosl. p. 327). At the date when the discourse between Socrates and Phaedrus was supposed to be held, Isocrates was too young to be introduced as the most eminent rhetorician of

## INTRODUCTION

the day. An older man must be taken, and it was natural to select the orator Lysias who had long enjoyed the highest reputation as a writer of speeches intended for the law-courts (*Phaedr.* 228 A, 257 B.C.). Before he became famous by his accusation of Eratosthenes (403 B.C.) he had been a teacher of rhetoric, and the written essay ascribed to him in the *Phaedrus* was probably a school-exercise of that earlier period. Cf. Lutosl. p. 327.

He is severely and justly censured by Socrates, first for the choice of such a subject, the essay being one of those ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι of which Lysias is said to have been the first author: cf. Thompson, *Phaedr.* pp. 82, 102. When Socrates consents to show how the same subject might have been more ably and more modestly treated, he says, 'I will put a veil over my face and run through the discourse as fast as I can, lest if I look at you I should not know what to say for shame.' But the criticism of Socrates is directed chiefly against the rhetorical faults in the essay of Lysias, who 'seemed to have said the same things two or three times over, like one too barren of matter to be able to say many things on one subject' . . . Also he appeared to me to make an ostentatious display of his skill in two different ways, both equally excellent as he flattered himself' (*Phaedr.* 235 A, Thompson). Again the arguments used by Lysias are described as mere commonplace platitudes, which even the worst of writers could not fail to use: they may be allowed and excused; there is no merit in inventing them, but only in the arrangement (236 A). Then after showing in an extemporary speech how the same subject might have been treated more skilfully and more effectively even on the principles of the rhetoric then in vogue, Socrates continues his criticism: 'It was a dreadful argument, *Phaedrus*, that of the speech which you brought with you, and of that which you made me utter . . . Silly and somewhat impious, and nothing could be worse than that. For if Love be something divine, he cannot be evil, though that was what both our speeches said of him. Their simplicity also was quite amusing, that having no truth nor honesty in them they made a solemn pretence of importance, in the hope of deceiving a few mannikins, and being admired by them' (243 A).

The censure was severe, and was as applicable to Isocrates as to Lysias; but Plato's purpose required yet more: it was neces-

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

sary not only to criticize the defects of the fashionable rhetoric, but also to prove the superiority of his own.

Socrates therefore proceeds (244 A) to give a definition of love as a species of divine madness. The soul, he argues, both divine and human, is immortal: its proper food is beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and its triple form—desire, energy (θυμικόν), and reason—may be described under the image of a charioteer borne upward by winged steeds. Then in an allegory unrivalled even in Plato for brilliancy of imagination, glowing splendour of language, and sublime speculation, he shows how by the aid of philosophy the love of beauty may rise as in that winged car to a realm beyond the bounds of matter and space and time, even to the heaven of heavens where justice, temperance, and knowledge absolute dwell ever unseen by mortal eye.

At the close of his second speech Socrates offers a prayer to Eros to forgive the faults of the two former speeches, laying the blame upon Lysias for choosing such a subject, instead of studying philosophy like his brother Polemarchus (257 A, B).

In the remainder of the dialogue Socrates proposes a scheme of rhetoric founded on true principles of science and morality (259 E, 260 A).

Among the essential requirements are (1) accurate knowledge, and observance of truth and justice (260 C); (2) clear definition (265 B); (3) organic arrangement (264 D); (4) generalization by concepts (265 D); (5) classification or division into species (265 E).

'Dialectic' thus described is then contrasted with the barren technicalities of the popular rhetoric (266 D-267 E), such as we see exposed in the *Euthydemus*.

Further, the 'dialectician' must understand the motives and principles of human action, and the 'varieties of human character, upon which he has to work in producing that "Persuasion" which is acknowledged to be the final cause of his art' (271 A-272 B; Thompson, Introduction, p. xiv). In short, true rhetoric must be based upon philosophy and morality. It is thus apparent that the *Phaedrus* is throughout a severe criticism of the kind of rhetoric of which Lysias and Isocrates were the most eminent professors: and 'if no names of contemporaries had been mentioned, it would not have been unreasonable to suspect that he (Isocrates) and not

## INTRODUCTION

Lysias was the orator at whom Plato's censures were principally aimed' (Thompson, p. 178). In the conclusion of the dialogue they are both brought forward by name. Lysias is to be told that 'He who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long turning and twisting this way and that, combining or separating one part and another, may be called poet or speech-maker, or writer of laws,' 278 E. Here the words *ἄνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν*, 'long patching and piecing' (Jowett), though addressed to Lysias are far more applicable to Isocrates, who was said to have spent ten or even fifteen years over his Panegyric oration, and was so long in composing a letter in the name of the Athenian state to persuade Philip to make peace, that peace was made long before the letter was ready.

In 278 E Phaedrus asks, 'What message will you send to Isocrates the fair?' and the answer is, 'Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him. I think he has a genius which rises above the orations of Lysias, and a moral character of finer mould. So I should not wonder if, as he grows older, he should both surpass all rivals in his present occupation of writing speeches, and becoming dissatisfied with this should be led on to higher things by some diviner impulse: for there is by nature a sort of philosophy in the man's intellect.'

At the time when Plato wrote, this pretended prophecy had been in part fulfilled, and in part already falsified: Isocrates had become the most eminent of rhetoricians, and the bitterest enemy of what Plato taught as the only true philosophy. What then are we to think of this apparent compliment? Was it sincere or ironical? Or partly ironical and partly sincere? The date to be assigned to the *Phaedrus*, and its relation to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*, depend in great measure on the answers to be given to these questions.

Cicero, a professed admirer of Isocrates, says that with this testimony of Plato in his favour he may disregard all other criticism (*Orator* xiii. 40). Then, after translating the passage of the *Phaedrus*, Cicero adds (42) 'Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur: at ea de seniore scribit Plato et scribit aequalis, et quidem exagitator omnium rhetorum hunc miratur unum. Me autem qui

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

Isocratem non diligunt una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur.'

Diogenes Laertius in his *Life of Plato* (iii. 9) says that he was a friend of Isocrates, resting his statement on no better reason than the fact that Praxiphanes the Peripatetic wrote a dialogue in which Plato and Isocrates were represented as holding a discussion on the Poets, the scene being laid in Plato's country house.

In recent times the question before us has been much discussed by German scholars, and by none more fully than by Eugen Holzner, *Plato's Phaedrus und die Sophistenrede des Isokrates*, Prag, 1894. He writes thus (p. 5): 'In an unprejudiced view there can be no doubt of one thing, that in those words Plato bestows real praise upon Isocrates; hereby the prophecy gains literary importance: for it must be compared with the fact that Plato and Isocrates were at open enmity. This points out the proper path of inquiry, for the business now is to seek in the works of both writers for the evidence of that former agreement of sentiment.'

Holzner then proceeds to compare the *Phaedrus* and the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* not with an unprejudiced mind but with the preconceived idea that 'if in the *Phaedrus* Plato appropriated thoughts of Isocrates, it will be easier to understand that he wished to speak of him in eulogistic terms in the conclusion of the work.'

This notion that Plato had borrowed his ideas from Isocrates is directly contrary to the judgement of some of the ablest students of Plato.

'Usener asserts (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxi. p. 21) that in the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* there is a distinct borrowing, sometimes even word for word, from the *Phaedrus*.' To this Holzner can only oppose the very feeble objection that 'Usener has omitted to prove that the relation which he establishes from the passages themselves is the only one possible.'

The passages chiefly discussed and compared are the following:—

*Phaedrus* 269 D.

Isocr. *Or.* xiii. § 20.

Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὃ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῆ ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκόσ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἶαν χρὴ τὰ μὲν

## INTRODUCTION

ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὡσπερ  
τᾶλλα. Εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει  
ῥητορικῶ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγι-  
μος προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ  
μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τού-  
των, ταύτη ἀτελής ἔσει. Ὅσον δὲ  
αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἢ Λυσίας τε καὶ  
Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι  
φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

According to Plato the power of becoming a perfect orator depends upon the possession of three necessary qualifications, i. A natural faculty for speaking, ii. Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), iii. Careful practice.

These are all indispensable: if either be wanting, the man will be in this respect imperfect. 'But so far as it is technical (*αὐτοῦ= τοῦ δύνασθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι*), the true method is not shown, I think, in the way by which Lysias and Thrasymachus proceed.'

Both Lysias and Thrasymachus had published manuals of the art of Rhetoric (*τέχνη ῥητορικῆ*), but these technical rules are expressly rejected by Plato both here and in other passages of the dialogue; cf. *Phaedr.* 269 B τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν φήθησαν ἠρῆκεναι: 271 C οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανούργοι εἰσι: 266 D where the usual contents of such manuals are described: see also Aristot. *Soph. Elench.* xxxiii. οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον.

The real art is described by Socrates, *Phaedr.* 271 D, and consists of (1) 'a dialectical training enabling the man to "divide" and to "collect," and (2) the power of applying his science to human nature and its varieties' (Thompson): compare with this the description of a true scheme of rhetoric on p. 25 of this Introduction.

Against this usual and natural interpretation of the passage Holzner argues that 'If *ἐπιστήμη* in 269 D already meant that later Dialectic and Psychology, it would be inconceivable that Plato in the words *ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη* denies to this orator any participation in the art. But Plato, as I believe, shows clearly enough

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

what he understands by *ἐπιστήμη*, the mechanical instrument of Rhetoric.'

On this paradoxical interpretation Lutoslawski justly remarks (341, note)—'Strangely enough this knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*, 262 D) has been misunderstood by many interpreters, as if it meant knowledge of the rules of rhetoric. Even E. Holzner, who corrects the error of those who identified this *ἐπιστήμη* with the following *τέχνη*, falls into an almost worse error in asserting the identity of *ἐπιστήμη* in this passage with τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα 269 B.'

In the two passages thus compared it is, I think, evident that Isocrates is commenting on Plato, and adopting his thoughts so far as they can be fitted to his own more meagre art of Rhetoric. There is then no evidence, so far, that Plato having borrowed from Isocrates was anxious to propitiate him by a compliment in the close of the dialogue.

In passing to the examination of that passage we must first consider the previous state of feeling between Plato and Isocrates. There had been an enmity of long standing between the rhetoricians and Socrates and his followers. They had their representative at his trial, one of the three accusers being the orator Lycon. 'Socrates had offended them by his incessant censure of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account' (Riddell, *Apology*, x); and this 'enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists' (ibid. p. xii, note). Of Plato's bitter resentment and continued censure there is abundant evidence in his earlier dialogues. Thus in the *Gorgias*, 503 A, Socrates describes two kinds of rhetoric, 'the one a trick of flattery and a base kind of popular declaration, the other noble, being the attempt to improve to the utmost the souls of the citizens, and the earnest striving to say what is best, whether that will prove more or less agreeable to the audience.' 'But such rhetoric as this,' says Socrates, 'you never yet saw; or if you have any one of this sort to point out among the orators, let me know at once who he is.' 'No, by my faith,' Callicles answers, 'I cannot name you any one, at any rate of the orators of the present day.'

Again, *Gorg.* 520 A, 'The Sophist and the rhetorician are the same thing, or as nearly as possible alike, as I said to Polus: but you for want of knowledge think the one, rhetoric, a very fine thing, and

## INTRODUCTION

the other you despise. Whereas in truth sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric.

Having thus ascertained the previous state of Plato's feeling towards Isocrates, we may now proceed to consider the exact meaning of the supposed compliment.

We notice first the manner in which the name of Isocrates is introduced: it shows that, though he had not been hitherto mentioned in the dialogue, its criticisms had been intended for him as well as for Lysias.

'*Soc.* Go then and tell this to your companion.

*Phaedr.* But what are you going to do yourself? For your own companion must by no means be passed over.

*Soc.* Whom do you mean?

*Phaedr.* The fair Isocrates. What message will you carry to him? What shall we say of him?

*Soc.* Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. I am willing, however, to tell you what I prophesy of him.'

At the *scenic* date of this conversation Isocrates was barely thirty, and being twenty-two years junior to Lysias is naturally described as still young. Socrates of course speaks of him as a former companion with all kindness and courtesy, and goes on to recognize his undoubted merits, as compared with Lysias, his superior genius and finer temperament. So far all is sincere praise, undeniably true, and expressed without a touch of irony. The expectation of Socrates that as years went on he would far surpass all competitors in the kind of speeches on which he was at that time engaged, had been amply fulfilled, and Plato does not fail to recognize fully the great ability and success of Isocrates. And yet his praise would not be altogether welcome. The speeches on which he had been engaged in the lifetime of Socrates might not altogether satisfy him. This also had come to pass; but it was a sore subject with Isocrates, as we have seen above in the passage of the *Antidosis* 310 B quoted above on p. 18, and Plato's allusion to it could hardly be felt as a sincere compliment.

In further fulfilment of the prophecy Isocrates had become dissatisfied with writing forensic speeches (*δικογραφία*), and adopted a style of oratory as far superior to that as the work of Pheidias to that of a doll-maker.

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

Finally Socrates expresses a hope that he may be attracted to philosophy for which he showed a natural capacity: and in fact, Isocrates was fond of dignifying his new style of oratory with the name of philosophy, though fully conscious that it was something totally different from what Socrates and Plato meant by philosophy, and that the modified admission *ἐνεστὶ τις φιλοσοφία* was not altogether complimentary. On the whole it seems impossible to doubt that while the pretended prophecy acknowledges the real merits of Isocrates, its praises are not unmixed with a delicate vein of satire which Isocrates could not fail to recognize.

If we now turn to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, we find that in the very first words (291 A) he finds fault with the large professions of persons 'undertaking the work of education,' as Plato we know was, and especially condemns the pretension to prophesy, which had been made by some rival teacher: 'For it is evident, I suppose, to all that foreknowledge of the future is not within the power of our nature . . . and this is one of the things impossible to man.' Then a little farther on, *c. Soph.* 293 B (a passage which has received less notice than it deserves), he clearly refers again to the prophecy concerning himself in the *Phaedrus*, and tries to appropriate the ambiguous compliment, as if it were in fact well deserved: 'I should have thought it a priceless gain if there had been in philosophy so great a power as these men say; for I perhaps should not have been the hindmost therein, nor would my share have been the smallest.'

It seems impossible to doubt that in these passages there is a direct answer to the prophecy in the *Phaedrus*, and this conclusion will be confirmed by the comparison in parallel columns of the original words of these and other passages of the two dialogues, which will be found at the end of this section of the Introduction, p. 33.

We therefore agree with Zeller (*Plato*, 132, note 94) that 'Spengel is certainly right in believing that the *Phaedrus* must have been written before the speech of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*.'

Spengel's conclusion is contained in his article *Isokrates und Plato* in the *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu München*, vol. vii. pp. 729-769. His argument is founded on the statements of Isocrates in the speech *De Antidosi* written in the year 355 B.C., when Isocrates was eighty-two years of age, as he is careful to mention, § 312 A:

## INTRODUCTION

ἔγραφον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐκ ἀκμάζων ἀλλ' ἔτη γεγονὸς δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. In this same speech, § 207, the latter half of the speech *Against the Sophists* was recited by Isocrates 'in more elegant language, but with the same meaning as before,' οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος ἀλαζονευόμενος φαίνομαι καὶ μεγάλας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιούμενος, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπολέλαικαί τοῦ πράγματος καὶ πρεσβύτερος γέγονα, τῆνικαῦτα ταπεινὴν ποιῶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις χρώμενος ἀκμάζων καὶ πανόμενος αὐτῆς (v. l. ἀκμῆς).

From the words ὅτε νεώτερος ἦν and ἀκμάζων Spengel argues (p. 751) that the speech *Against the Sophists* must have been written fifty years before the *De Antidosis*, i. e. about the year 405 B. C., six years before the death of Socrates, and when Plato was about twenty-three years old.

This palpable mistake is due to a misunderstanding of the words νεώτερος and ἀκμάζων. Aristotle says that the soul is at its prime about the age of forty-nine years (*Rhet.* ii. 14, 4). Now, when an old man of eighty-two speaks of what he has done when he was 'younger' and 'in his prime,' adding that he is no longer 'in his prime,' but 'declining from it,' he does not mean to speak of a time fifty years ago, but thirty or five-and-thirty at most, i. e. between B. C. 390 (the date supposed by Lutoslawski) and B. C. 385. In this interval, namely in B. C. 388 or 387, Plato began to teach in the Academy. Stallbaum in his *Prolegomena* to the *Phaedrus* has shown, I think, good reason for believing that it was written at this time, and Zeller is of the same opinion. If this view be accepted, the order of the three works in question will be as follows:

(1) Plato, *Phaedrus*, (2) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, (3) Plato, *Euthydemus*. The three dialogues will thus have been all published within two or three years after B. C. 388, in which year Plato was forty-one and Isocrates forty-eight years old.

'There is no contradiction,' writes Lutoslawski (p. 211), 'from the standpoint either of logical or of stylistic development in admitting the close relation between the *Euthydemus* and Isocrates' discourse *Against the Sophists*. This relation, first noticed by Spengel and Thompson, has been since investigated by Teichmüller, Sudhaus, Dümmler, and recognized by Zeller and Susemihl, without any noteworthy opposition. According to these investigations the

## V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE

*Euthydemus* must have been published not before 390 and probably not much later.'

That Isocrates in the oration *Against the Sophists* is referring to Plato's *Phaedrus* will, I think, be placed beyond doubt if we set a few selected passages opposite to each other in parallel columns.

### I. ON PROPHECYING.

*Phaedr.* 278 E Νέος ἔτι, ᾧ Φαῖδρε, Ἴσοκράτης· δ' μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

242 C εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις.

244 C τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἧ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται.

ISOCT. 291 B εὐθὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων ψευδῆ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν· οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπασιν εἶναι φανερόν· ὅτι τὰ μέλλοντα προ- γινώσκουσιν οὐ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἐστίν.

292 C περὶ μὲν τῶν μελλόντων εἶδέναι προσποιουμένους.

### II. ON THE RELATION OF ISOCRATES HIMSELF TO PHILOSOPHY.

*Phaedr.* 279 A φύσει γάρ, ᾧ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ.

ISOCT. 293 B 'Εγὼ δὲ πρὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἂν χρημάτων ἐτιμησάμην τηλικούτου δύνασθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὅσον οἱ τοὶ λέγουσιν· ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἡμεῖς πλείστον ἀπελείφθημεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλάχιστον μέρος ἀπελαύσαμεν αὐτῆς. id. *De Antidosis* 289 τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινῶν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί.

### III. ON THE INFERIORITY OF OPINION (δόξα) TO KNOWLEDGE (ἐπιστήμη).

*Phaedr.* 248 B ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θείας ἀπέρχονται (αἱ ψυχαί), καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῆ χρῶνται, 'feed on the chaff and husks of opinion' (Thompson).

260 C ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν . . . δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκῶς πείσῃ

ISOCT. 292 C 'Ἐπειδὴν κατίδωσι . . . μᾶλλον ὁμοιοῦντας καὶ πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχον ἐπαγγελλομένους κτλ.

294 D ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι.

## INTRODUCTION

κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τιν' ἂν οἶε μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

262 B λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ᾧ ἐταίρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

[That this was the fixed opinion of Isocrates is seen in a later dialogue *Panathenaicus* 234 D, where he describes his own genius as πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τελείαν οὔτε πανταχῆ χρησίμην, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένη τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων.]

291 B προσποιῶνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν.

### IV. ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS OF WRITTEN AND ORAL DISCOURSE.

*Phaedr.* 275 A καὶ νῦν σύ, πατήρ ὧν γραμμάτων, δι' εὖνοιαν τοῦναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελητησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτριῶν τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδον αὐτοῦς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους. Οὐκ οὖν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὔρες· σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις.

275 D Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφές καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι.

278 A ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκόμενοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐν μόνοις (τούτοις) τό τε ἐναργές ἐστὶν καὶ τέλειον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς.

Isocr. 293 C Θαυμάζω δ' ὅταν ἴδω τούτους μαθητῶν ἀξιουμένους, οἱ ποιητικῶν πράγματος τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες ληθήθασιν σφᾶς αὐτούς. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε πλὴν τούτων ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν γραμμάτων ἀκινήτως ἔχει καὶ μένει κατὰ ταῦτόν, ὥστε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν χρώμενοι διατελούμεν, τὸ δὲ τῶν λόγων πᾶν τοῦναντίον πέπονθεν.

293 E τοῖς δὲ γράμμασιν οὐδενὸς τούτων προσεδέγησεν· ὥσθ' οἱ χρώμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις παραδείγμασι πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἀποτινοῖεν ἢ λαμβάνοιεν ἀργύριον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτοὶ δεόμενοι παιδεύειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

In these two passages Isocrates treats the opinion expressed in the *Phaedrus* as a mere platitude known to every body, and proving its author to be unfit for a teacher.

## VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES

### V. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY.

239 B πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὄθεν ἂν μάλιστα ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὄθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ἢ θέα φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν.

Isocr. 294 A ἡγοῦμαι πάντας ἂν μοι τοὺς εὐφρονοῦντας συνειπεῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων ἰδιῶται διετέλεσαν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐδενὶ πάποτε συγγενομένοι τῶν σοφιστῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν.

### VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES.

The chief instrument employed by the Sophists in their discussions was the 'Sophistical Elenchus,' a seeming but not real refutation of the opponent's statement. The various forms of this device are fully described in a treatise ascribed to Aristotle and entitled *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. 'Of confutation there are two kinds; for some depend on the language, and others are independent of the language. The causes dependent on language which produce the false appearance of reasoning are six in number' (*Soph. El.* iv. 525). These are 'Equivocation' the ambiguity of a term (*ἀμωνυμία*), the ambiguity of a proposition (*ἀμφιβολία*), false composition (*σύνθεσις*), false disjunction (*διαίρεσις*), wrong accentuation (*προσφῶδία*), formation of words (*σχῆμα λέξεως*).

This arrangement was retained by subsequent writers on Logic, as for instance by Aldrich, whose explanation of the several fallacies will be found in Mansel's *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, Appendix, pp. 133 ff.

In the *Euthydemus* we have first several examples of the fallacy of *Equivocation*.

(i) 275 D 3 πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

(ii) 276 D 7 Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἄ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

The explanation is given by Plato himself in 277 E, where Socrates comforts Cleinias by telling him that the Sophists wish to teach him first the right use of words, that *μανθάνω* may mean

## INTRODUCTION

either to acquire knowledge of something previously unknown, or to examine and understand (*συνιέναι*) it by the use of such knowledge.

The same explanation is given in Aristot. *Soph. EL*. iv. 1. *Ἐισὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τὸ τε ξυιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.*

We observe also that the words *σοφοί*, *ἀμαθεῖς*, and *ἐπίσταται* are all used equivocally in the discussion of these two questions.

(iii) 283 D *Οὐκοῦν ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι.* The pronoun *ὅς* is here equivocal, being used both in its proper sense as referring to a person and in an adjectival sense like *οἷος*.

(iv) 283 E 9 *Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα;* Here also *λέγειν* is used in two different senses, either 'to speak of a thing,' or to 'speak (i. e. utter) a word.' 'Scilicet is qui loquitur, *loquitur de re aliqua*, nec nisi improprie dicitur *rem loqui*. Verba igitur, quae faciat loquens, omnino existunt et vere sunt; sed nisi res existant et eundem ad modum quo verba prae se ferunt ea non sunt vera' (Routh).

The original question out of which this equivocation arises, ἢ *δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψεῦδεσθαι*, is discussed at great length in *Cratyl.* 385 B, and again *Soph.* 236 E-246 A, where after examining the many difficulties involved in the dogma of Parmenides 'that not-being is' Plato comes to the conclusion that the nature of 'being' is quite as difficult to define as that of 'not-being' (*ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπωρότερον εἰπεῖν ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστιν*).

(v) 284 C 2 *οὐκ ἄρα τὰ γε μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, λέγει οὐδέεις.* Again the fallacy lies in the assumption that to speak or think of a *thing* is the same as *doing* something to the thing itself, thereby making it a *real object* (*ὥστε καὶ εἶναι ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὅστισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα;*) 284 B 6.

I do not understand how Bonitz explains this and the two preceding fallacies as dependent upon the identification of subject and predicate, i. e. that the *λόγος τοῦ πράγματος* is the same as the thing itself.

(vi) 284 D I *εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει;* As used by Ctesippus *ὡς ἔχει* refers only to the true relation between

## VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES

subject and predicate, as in *Cratyl.* 385 B *Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος, ὅς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγη ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής; ὅς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής;* but Dionysodorus makes *ὡς ἔχει* refer to the conditions or qualities of the subject, and afterwards seeks refuge from the sarcasm of Ctesippus, 284 D 2, in the ambiguous use of *κακῶς λέγειν*, a fallacy *παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν*: *Sophist. EL*. iv. 4.

(vii) 285 D 7 *Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν . . . ποιῶ τοὺς λόγους;* Every thing has its own proper definition. If two men give the proper definition (*λόγον*), there is no contradiction.

If they give different definitions, they are not speaking of the same thing, and again there is no contradiction.

This rests on the assumption that the definition given, i. e. the predicate, is identical with the subject (Bonitz).

(viii) 287 C I *τί . . . νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα;* Here *νοεῖ* is applied metaphorically to a thing without life, and the Sophist immediately seizes on the ambiguous use of the word: cf. 305 A *παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται.* This is an example of the second kind of ambiguity, in the use of a word in a sense which is customary but not proper (*ὅταν εὐωθέτες ὁμῶς οὕτω λέγειν, Soph. EL*. iv. 4). Socrates is willing to admit his error, only it had been argued (287 A) that to err is impossible.

(ix) 293 C 4 *οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα;* This and several following arguments of the Sophists are examples of the fallacy 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter,' which is described in Aristot. *Soph. EL*. iv. 10 *τὸ ἀπλῶς, ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῆ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι.*

(x) 295 E 4 *πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῶ δ' ἐπίστασαι ἢ οὐ;* The Sophist proceeds to argue that since Socrates 'knows all things (that he knows) always (by the same faculty),' therefore 'he knows all things always,' the limitations being disregarded. This argument is closed by a *reductio ad absurdum*, when Socrates asks (296 E 4), 'Do I know that the good are unjust?' Dionysodorus admits that Socrates does not know this, and so does not know all things.

The only resource left to the Sophists is to refuse to answer the questions of Socrates, and to insist on his answering a series of captious quibbles which they hang upon any convenient word that is casually employed by him. This neglect of methodical arrange-

## INTRODUCTION

ment, far from being a fault, is part of Plato's artistic imitation of the eristic mode of argument, while he yet 'allows a definite order to peep out in this seemingly arbitrary irregularity' (Bonitz, 259, note 7).

(xi) Thus 297 E 5 Patrocles the half-brother of Socrates both *is* and *is not* his brother. Chaeredemus the father of Patrocles not being Sophroniscus the father of Socrates both is and is not a father, and Sophroniscus being different from a father (Chaeredemus) is not a father, and Socrates had no father.

(xii) 298 C 2 ἢ οἴει τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; Hence a father of one is a father of all, and the father and mother of Euthydemus are father and mother of all kinds of animals, and Euthydemus brother of puppies and little pigs.

(xiii) 298 E 3. The dog is *yours*, Ctesippus, and he is the *father* of puppies, therefore he is *your father*, and you the puppies brother. Cf. *Soph. El.* xxiv. 2 Ἄρ' ὁ ἀνδρῖας σὸν ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; *ibid.* 4 οἶον εἰ ὅδε ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἔστι δὲ σός. Cf. 298 C 4.

(xiv) 299 A 6. That no one wants good things in great quantities, being proved in the case of medicine, is assumed to be true universally.

Thus in the group ix-xiv the arguments of the Sophists all involve the fallacy of omitting all limitations, and passing arbitrarily 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.'

(xv) 300 A 4 δυνατὰ οὖν ὄντων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Cf. *Soph. El.* iv. 527 καὶ ἄρα ὁ ὄρᾶ τις, τοῦτο ὄρᾶ; ὄρᾶ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὄρᾶ ὁ κίων. Here *τοῦτο* is ambiguous; it may mean either τὸν κίονα or ὁ κίων. Cf. Foste, *Soph. El.* p. 105. Cf. 300 A 2, note.

(xvi) 300 B 1 ἢ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε σιγῶντα λέγειν; Cf. *Soph. El.* iv. 523 καὶ ἄρ' ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τὸ τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα, *ibid.* x. 558. See notes on 300 B.

(xvii) 300 B 2 ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; The fallacy is the same as in xvi, for λέγοντα σιγᾶν may mean either 'a speaker's silence,' or 'silence about a speaker.'

(xviii) 301 A 6 καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοὶ πάρεμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἰ; The sense of πάρεμι here is different from that of πάρεστι in A 4 πάρεστιν μέντοι ἐκάστω αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. The fallacy therefore is παρ' ὁμωνυ-

## VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES

μίαν, πάρεστι being changed from its meaning as a philosophical term to its common sense of local proximity.

(xix) 301 D 3 τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν. Another example of the fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν, as μάγειρον may be either subject or object of κατακόπτειν.

(xx) 303 A 1 ἄρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς (τοὺς θεοὺς) ἀποδόσθαι; This final paradox is the result of a whole series of fallacies. 'For θεός the universal ζῶον is substituted, the possessive σός is applied to ζῶον and to θεός in different senses, and then what is true only of a particular class of ζῶα is predicated of ζῶα universally and so of θεός' (Bonitz, p. 263). Cf. *Soph. El.* v. 533 ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῆ.

(xxi) 303 A 7 Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἐστιν, κτλ.; Dionysodorus pretends to understand the exclamation πυππάξ as a proper name, and besides this silly grammatical joke assumes that if two words stand side by side they must be in apposition.

On the fallacies thus enumerated compare Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. 266. We may add to the series the example of *Fallacia Accidentis*, 298 B 2 ἔτερος ὢν πατὴρ οὐ πατήρ ἐστίν, and the *Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum*, 300 C 7, where Ctesippus insists on a categorical answer 'Yes' or 'No' to his question, 'Do all things keep silence or speak?' See the notes on these passages. Notice also that in 301 C 1 ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν Socrates himself adopts the fallacy of equivocation, turning it against the Sophists.

Besides the long series of fallacies thus exposed, there are more important logical principles to be noticed in the dialogue.

In *Euthyd.* 301 A 'Beautiful things are not the same as absolute beauty, but some beauty is present with each of them,' we have an example of the process of *generalization by concepts* which had been already fully described in the *Meno*, 75 A ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν, κτλ. On the importance of the discovery see Lotze, *Microcosm.* ii. 319, 320: 'Long as it was since language had begun to indicate in words the general concepts of things . . . consciousness had still continued unaware of what it was about; and even for the contemporaries of Socrates it was hard to see that the convenience of using a common name for different things arose from their dependence upon something which was common to them all, and in all self-identical.'

## INTRODUCTION

Of *Definition*, which follows immediately from the doctrine of *General Concepts*, we have a brief statement in *Euthyd.* 285 E 9 εἰσὶν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι, κτλ., where right definition is shown to be necessary as the means of avoiding contradiction. This subject also had been fully treated in *Meno* 72-76.

Not less important is the question of *Predication*, and the denial of any proper union between *Subject* and *Predicate* implied but not explained in *Euthyd.* 300 E 3, where Dionysodorus asks Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πάποτε εἶδες, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; The denial began with Antisthenes the Cynic, and was adopted by Stilpo the Megarian, of whom Zeller writes, *Socrates*, p. 277: 'He rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.'

That predication does not necessarily imply the identity of subject and predicate is shown by Plato in the *Sophist* 251 A: 'Let us inquire then how we come to predicate many names of the same thing. . . And thus we provide a rich feast for tiros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that man is good; but man, they insist, is man, and good is good' (Jowett).

The term *Not-Being* (τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὰ μὴ ὄντα), which occurs several times in the *Euthydemus*, does not there receive its true explanation. The Sophists maintain, in accordance with the doctrine of Parmenides, that τὸ μὴ ὄν can never be the object of thought or speech or any kind of action (*Euthyd.* 284 B, 286 A). The question is treated in the same manner in the *Republic* 477 A, 478 B. The true explanation of the difficulty is first reached in the *Sophist* 237 B-238 D, where the doctrine of Parmenides is formally discussed, and in 257 B it is explained that '*Not-Being* means only different *Being*, and denotes the relation of notions which do not agree with each other' ('Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς εἰκεν, οὐκ ἕναρτίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον). Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socr. Philos.* i. 606; Lutoslawski, p. 228.

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

The term *Σοφιστής* denoted in its earliest use an eminent master of some liberal art.

Thus in Pindar, *Isthm.* iv. (v.) 28 it means 'poets':

μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς  
Διὸς ἔκατι πρόσβαλον.

It is applied to 'musicians' in a fragment of Aeschylus quoted by Athenaeus, xiv. 632 C καὶ πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ (τῇ μουσικῇ) σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Δισχύλος ἐποίησεν'

εἴτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυ.

Thamyris is described by the same term in Euripides, *Rhes.* 924:

ὄτ' ἦλθομεν . . .  
Μοῦσαι μέγιστον εἰς ἔριω μελωδίας  
δεινῷ σοφιστῇ Θρηκί, κἀτυφλώσαμεν  
Θάμυριν.

It is applied by Herodotus, ii. 49, to the priests of the Bacchic mysteries, and (iv. 95) as a title of honour to Pythagoras ('Ελλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ), and to the wise men of Greece including Solon by name (i. 29).

When Herodotus thus wrote the name 'Sophist' had already been assumed in a special sense by one whose arrogant claims to universal knowledge, and acceptance of pecuniary reward, quickly tended to degrade an honourable title into a byword and a reproach. Protagoras first appeared in Athens about the middle of the fifth century B.C.

'It was the time when the controversies which had long been carried on in the ancient schools of philosophy had been succeeded by an interval of general lassitude, despondency, and indifference to philosophical truth, which afforded room for a new class of pretenders to wisdom, who in a sense which they first attached to the word were first called Sophists.

'They professed a science superior to all the elder forms of philosophy, which it balanced against each other with the perfect impartiality of *universal scepticism*; and an art which treated them all as instruments useless indeed for the discovery of truth, but equally capable of exhibiting a fallacious appearance of it . . .

'As according to this view there was no real difference between

## INTRODUCTION

truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the proper learning of a statesman consisted in the arts of argument and persuasion by which he might sway the opinions of others on every subject at his pleasure, and these were the arts which they practised and taught' (Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. xxiv).

It will be well to inquire first whether this is a fair representation of Plato's description of the Sophist, and further whether that description is confirmed by other contemporary testimony.

Plat. *Phaed.* 90 B: 'Most especially those who devote themselves to the practice of disputation end, you know, by thinking that they have become the cleverest fellows in the world, and that they alone have discovered that neither in things nor in arguments is there anything sound or sure, but that all existing objects are in a constant flux and reflux, exactly as in the Euripus, and never abide an instant in any state.'

Ibid. 91 A: 'Just at present I fear that on this very subject I am not in a philosophic mood, but, like those vulgar disputants, in a contentious humour. For they whenever they are disputing on a point are utterly regardless of the real truth of the matters in question, but are only anxious to make their own positions seem true to the hearers.'

Ibid. 101 E: 'You would not, like those Eristics (*οἱ ἀντιλογικοί*), confuse in your argument the first principle and its consequences, that is if you wished to discover any real truth.'

*Meno* 75 C: 'I should have told him the truth, and if the inquirer were one of those wise and Eristic and antagonistic persons I should say to him, That is what I have to say, and if I am wrong, it is your business to take up the argument and refute me.'

*Rep.* 454 A: 'Truly, Glaucon, said I, the power of the art of contradiction is a noble one.—Why so?—Because it seems to me that many fall into it even against their will, and think that they are reasoning when they are only disputing, because they cannot examine the question by dividing and classifying, but persist in contradicting the mere words of the argument, and practising disputation not real discussion.'

*Sophist.* 225 E: 'But who is the other who makes money out of private disputations (*ἐπίδωον*)? There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

re-appears again for the fourth time.—Yes, for he is the money-making species, as it seems, of the Eristic art, that disputations, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now shown, in a word the Sophist.'

The extreme contrast between the stigma thus affixed by Plato to the name 'Sophist' and its original use as a title of honour is so remarkable, that we cannot wonder if historians of different schools of thought have adopted widely different explanations of so surprising a change. Until the middle of the last century it was generally believed that Plato's descriptions corresponded more or less closely to the real character and practices of the Sophists of his day. But the confidence with which this view was entertained received a sudden shock when Mr. Grote published his famous defence of the Sophists in his *History of Greece*, vol. vii. ch. 67. The effect produced by that brilliant but paradoxical essay was, however, of short duration. More exact and impartial students had no difficulty in showing that the misrepresentations alleged by the modern historian were for the most part based upon his own misinterpretation of the ancient testimony. See especially Cope's excellent article 'The Sophists' in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. ii. 1854, and the same scholar's *Gorgias*, Introduction, pp. xxii, xxiii; Poste, Aristotle's *Sophistical Elenchi*, p. 100; Jowett, *Sophist*, Introd. pp. 377-380.

It was alleged by Grote (p. 486) that Plato 'stole the term Sophistes out of general circulation . . . and fastened it upon the eminent teachers of the Socratic age.' That the term was in general circulation, and that it was fastened in an unfavourable sense upon a certain class of teachers of bad eminence in the Socratic age, is easily shown by the testimony of contemporary writers other than Plato.

Thus Lysias says in his *Olympic Oration*, 912: 'I have not come hither to make petty quibbles nor to dispute about names. For I think that these are the practices of very worthless Sophists in great want of a livelihood.' Only the commencement of this oration is extant, but according to Plutarch, *Life of Lysias*, *Mor.* 836 D, it was read by him at the Olympic Festival. However this may be, it is certain that the composition could only have been undertaken in the short interval when Lysias was in possession

## INTRODUCTION

of the full rights of citizenship, that is, during the Archonship of Euclides, B.C. 403.

In that same year Thucydides returned from exile to Athens, and was still engaged in the composition of his History: a description of the Athenians which he puts into the mouth of Cleon (iii. 38) shows somewhat of his estimation of the Sophists, and the theatrical character of their public exhibitions: ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσωμένοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς εὐκότεες καθημένοι μάλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοι. The Scholiast remarks that σοφιστῶν here means 'those who in customary language are so called, the teachers of rhetorical questions.' Lysias was no friend of Plato, and Thucydides was too grave a writer to give currency to any slanderous gossip, so that their testimony leaves no room to doubt the existence at Athens of a distinct class of Sophists such as Plato describes. We may therefore confidently accept the further descriptions given by Xenophon and Aristotle, without attributing them to the mere prejudice or jealousy of the Socratic School.

Nothing can be more severe than the censure of Socrates himself as recorded in Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 13 καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὡσπερ πόρονους ἀποκαλοῦσιν. The plural ἀποκαλοῦσιν implies that this was not an uncommon way of speaking of the Sophists. A like evil reputation is indicated in Xenophon, *De Venatione*, xiii. 8, where in a full description of their methods of teaching he adds—οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, καὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ὠφελούσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἔστιν ὕβριδος παρά γε τοῖς ἐδ' φρονούσι.

Aristotle's opinion of the Sophists is sufficiently shown in a passage of the *Ethics*, ix. 1: 'In such matters some like the principle of a "stated wage." Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.' Sir A. Grant remarks on this passage that 'Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of "the Sophists" after the profession had become regularly settled.'

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

Compare *Sophistical Elenchi*, c. i: 'Now it answers the purpose of some persons rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be than to be and not to seem: for sophistry is seeming but unreal philosophy, and the Sophist a person who makes money by the semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his success it is requisite to seem to perform the function of the philosopher without performing it rather than to perform it without seeming to do so. . . The existence of such a mode of reasoning, and the fact that such a faculty is the aim of the persons we call Sophists, is manifest' (Poste's translation).

Mr. Poste's own conclusion concerning the Sophists is expressed as follows (p. 100): 'Did the Sophist ever exist? Was there ever a class of people who professed to be philosophers and to educate, but, instead of method or a system of reasoned truth, only knew and only taught, under the name of philosophy, the game of eristic? . . . Grote says, the only reality corresponding to the name are the *disiecti membra sophistae* in all of us, the errors incidental to human frailty in the search after truth.'

On the manner in which Grote tries to disparage the testimony of Aristotle, see Cope, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, p. 160.

A question was raised by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the dialogue whether Euthydemus and his brother were real persons and such as Plato describes them. 'Who, then, were these men, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, to deserve such notice and meet with such treatment? History is silent respecting them more than any other of the Sophists mentioned by Plato, so that we may certainly conclude that they never formed any kind of school, nay it would even seem that they were not generally men in very great repute.'

We readily agree that these itinerant professors of universal knowledge were men of no great repute; but they were none the less fit representatives on that account of the low class of Sophists of Plato's day, whom it was part of his purpose to expose. Also the testimony of history is sufficient to show that they were certainly real persons, and in some respects at least such as Plato has described them.

Dionysodorus the elder brother (283 A) is the subject of a whole

## INTRODUCTION

chapter in Xenophon, *Mem. Socr.* iii. i. 1-11. He comes to Athens pretending to teach strategy, but actually teaching nothing beyond the merest elementary tactics and those most imperfectly. 'Go back,' says Socrates, 'and ask him again: for if he knows these things and is not a shameless person, he will be ashamed after taking money to send you away untaught.' How exactly this agrees with Plato's description of the two Sophists and their pretensions may be seen by referring to *Euthyd.* 271 D, 273 C, and to the specimens of their actual teaching in the discussions which follow.

Euthydemus is mentioned by name in the *Cratylus* 386 D, where a distinction is drawn between the dogma of Protagoras that 'for every man all things really are such as they appear to him,' and the more extravagant paradox of Euthydemus, that 'all things are alike to all men at the same time and always.' Other passages in which allusions more or less evident are made to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are *Sophist.* 251 B, C, and *Pol.* 495 C, D. But the independent testimony of Aristotle proves beyond all question both that Euthydemus was a person well known at Athens, and that he used in discussion similar fallacies to those which Plato imputes to him. Cf. *Aristot. Rhetor.* ii. 24 "Ἄλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὄν ταῦτόν πολλακίς, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. "Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος. Οἷον τὸ εἶδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. Καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν. *Soph. Elench.* xx. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, Ἄρ' οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὖσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὄν; It is needless to quote the words of Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.* vii. 13, *ibid.* 48, 64, as the statements of so late a writer can add no weight to the contemporary testimony of such authors as Xenophon and Aristotle.

On this historical testimony we cannot refuse to believe that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons well known at Athens at the *scenic* date of the dialogue, and at that time elderly men like Socrates.

But a further question has been raised by Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, I. ii, who maintains with much ingenuity that Dionysodorus is intended to represent Lysias. The theory is based upon the points of resemblance which may be traced between them.

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

(1) Lysias and Dionysodorus each had a younger brother named Euthydemus: the occurrence therefore of this name in the dialogue would at once turn the thoughts of Plato's contemporaries to Lysias and Euthydemus, the well-known sons of Cephalus (*Plat. Rep.* 328 B).

(2) Both pairs of brothers had joined the colony which the Athenians founded at Thurii 444 B.C.

(3) Lysias was not, except for a few months, an Athenian citizen but a *ξένος*, though *ἰσοπέλης*.

The two Sophists were also *ξένοι* (271 A).

(4) Lysias was at one time a teacher of rhetoric, having been a pupil of Tisias the founder, with Corax, of the Sicilian school of dialectic.

This was the same system as that which Diodorus and his brother are described as practising.

(5) Lysias was joint owner with his brother of a shield manufactory in Peiraeus, and had helped Thrasybulus with money, shields, and a band of mercenaries. If, as Teichmüller thinks, Euthydemus the brother of Lysias is the Sophist described by Plato, *Theaet.* 165 D, as *πελταστικός ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις*, the phrases there applied to him all relate to the art of war, *ἐλλοχῶν, ἐμβολῶν, χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ ξυνδήσας, ἐλύτρου*.

From *Xen. Mem.* iii. 1 we know that Dionysodorus came to Athens as a teacher of the art of strategy, and both brothers are described by Plato as masters of the art of fighting in heavy armour (*ὄπλομάχοι*).

(6) Lysias was the most successful writer of speeches for the warfare of the law-courts.

In the dialogue (272 A) Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are both described as *τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφασθαι λόγους οἷους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια*, and in 273 C as *οἶω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατόν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ*. The description is remarkably applicable to Lysias, who not only wrote speeches and taught others, but had made himself famous by the one excellent speech which he had himself delivered in court against the injuries done to him by Eratosthenes, 403 B.C.

Many other points of resemblance more or less striking are discussed by Teichmüller in a long chapter, but the examples given

## INTRODUCTION

above are sufficient to show the general nature of his argument. The degree of probability resulting from it is much increased by the consideration that 'Plato in his dialogues does not rehearse old histories, as a chronicler or a novelist; but contends with living opponents and rival teachers, who disputed with him for influence over the best men of the time and especially over the young, since they professed to teach the same things as he did, only better.'

The theory is very interesting, and by no means improbable: it agrees well with the known relations of Plato and Lysias, and adds to the life and spirit of the dialogue.

### VIII. TEXT.

In this edition of the *Euthydemus* the text is based upon the three chief MSS. collated by Schanz.

(1) Codex Clarkianus, n. 39 in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, written in the year 895 B.C. by Johannes Calligraphus for Arethas a Deacon of Patras, afterwards Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. This excellent MS. is very fully described by Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, 105-118, and by T. W. Allen in the *Preface to the Phototype edition*, 1898. In the MS. as a whole there are many corrections by the hand of the learned Archbishop himself (*Classical Review*, vol. xvi. Nos. 1 and 8). These contemporary corrections (B<sup>2</sup>) are rightly distinguished by Professor Burnet from later corrections (b). But in the *Euthydemus* there is only one legible note in the margin, and this is in the handwriting of Arethas, and refers to the word *σκληφρός*, 271 B 4.

(2) T. In the Library of St. Mark's at Venice this MS. is described as 'Append. Class. 4, cod. 1,' and by Bekker as t: it has been shown by Schanz 'to be the source of all MSS. of the second family,' except that which immediately follows.

(3) Vind., or V, distinguished by Burnet as 'W= cod. Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 = Stallbaum Vind. 1.' This MS. Schanz considered to be derived not directly from T, but from a common source, which he marked by the letter M.

In choosing between various readings I have preferred those of Cod. B as being by far the oldest and best authority, except where they are evidently corrupt or fail to give any adequate meaning to the passage.

## VIII. TEXT

The text of Plato as represented in the MSS. has been subjected to much alteration by recent critics, among whom Cobet, Badham, and Schanz are especially distinguished for ingenious emendations and brilliant conjectures, often most successful, and, even when unnecessary, very attractive. In Schanz's edition of the *Euthydemus* such alterations and omissions are extremely frequent, and Professor Burnet has done good service to the students of Plato in the Oxford edition by frequently restoring the readings of the chief MSS.

I have acted on the same principle still more frequently, being convinced that it is often easier to alter the words of such an author as Plato than to understand and explain them. It is, however, the duty of an editor not to tamper with a reading authenticated by the best MSS., until he has exhausted all means within his power of elucidating the words ascribed to his author. Wherever I have ventured to differ from recent editors, I have stated my reasons in the notes.

In the matter of orthography I have been unwilling to depart unnecessarily from long-established and almost universal custom.

Thus, for example, I have retained the usual method of printing the pronoun *ὄτι* so as to distinguish it from the conjunction *ὅτι*. The usefulness of the distinction may be seen in such phrases as *οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅτι εἶεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί* (*Euthyd.* 271 C), *ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ μαθησόμεθα* (272 D), *σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, ὅτι μου . . . καταφύδει* (283 E), *τὸν ἡμέτερον πατέρ' ἂν τύπτωμι, ὅτι μαθὼν σοφοῦς υἱεὶς οὕτως φύσει* (299 A), *οὐπω οἶδα ὅτι μέλλω εἶρεῖν*.

Passages thus printed may have no ambiguity for a competent scholar, but they put a needless difficulty in the way of a beginner.

It is more important, however, to consider whether this mode of printing is or is not etymologically correct. The combination *ὄς τις, ἢ τις, ὄτι* is made up of two separate words, each of which is separately declined, as *Pol.* 462 C *ἐν ἣ τινι δὴ πόλει*, where, if we write *ἦτινι* as one word, the accent becomes impossible. Cf. *Plat. Epist.* vii. 347 E *ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως ἤθελε καὶ οἷς τισι*. *Epist.* xi. 359 A *ὑπὸ νόμων θέσεως καὶ ἄν τινων*. *Legg.* ix. 864 E *τὴν βλάβην ἣν ἂν τινα καταβλάβῃ*. If therefore we were to be guided by etymology, both the pronoun and the conjunction should be written *ὄτι*, but for the

## INTRODUCTION

sake of distinguishing them the conjunction is conventionally written as one word  $\delta\tau\iota$ .

The remarks and practice of Jannaris are inconsistent and misleading: in 610. 3 he prints ' $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma, \delta\tau\iota$ ,' and adds in a footnote<sup>1</sup>, 'It should be written  $\delta\tau\iota$ , but ancient grammarians introduced  $\delta, \tau\iota$ —for which modern scholars substitute  $\delta \tau\iota$ —to distinguish it from the conjunction  $\delta\tau\iota$  'that' (79).' But Jannaris himself constantly prints  $\delta, \tau\iota$ , as in  $\delta, \tau\iota \muαθών, \delta, \tau\iota παθών$ : see his Index.

Cf. Kühner-Blass I. i. 353 (§ 93 Diastole) ' $\delta, \tau\iota$ , nicht wie  $\delta\tau\iota$ .'

We may add that Schanz is mistaken in his critical note on 271 C 6, ' $\delta\tau\iota$  BT,' for Cod. B certainly has  $\delta \tau\iota$ .

272 A 5  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$  B,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ . There is apparently no authority in the MSS. for the latter form which is adopted in the Oxford text, 1903.

In Kühner-Blass, *Auswählliche Grammatik*, § 277, p. 186,  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$  is described as 'nachklass'; and in § 285, p. 201, on the Doric dialect, we find 'Von  $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$  lautet das Pf.  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\kappa\alpha, \tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\mu\alpha\iota$ , so auf Inschr.  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$ .' In this case  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\kappa\alpha$  stood for  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$ .

Jannaris is of opinion that the diphthong EI arose from the insertion of a simple vertical stroke (not iota) to mark the metrical quantity of E (App. ii. 9). 'Accordingly, when representing a rhythmical or grammatical length E now begins (sixth century B.C.) to figure in the Attic inscriptions as EI (later on as  $\square$  or H identified with EI) . . . only in sporadic cases, the old orthography . . . remaining in universal practice down to the middle of the fifth century B.C. . . . It is only since the year 403 B.C., under the archonship of Euclides, (that) the new spelling obtained by a public act official recognition or formal sanction' (ibid. 12). The further inference of Jannaris that 'a new system of orthography was created into which *all previous literary and many inscriptional compositions had to be transliterated*' (the italics are mine) must be regarded as a somewhat doubtful or, at least, exaggerated conjecture. It is, I believe, generally acknowledged that such forms as  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ , and  $\phi\omicron\beta\eta$  (2nd person *indicative* middle), are unknown to the MSS. of the Attic drama, and it would require much more evidence than has yet been alleged to prove in opposition to all MSS. that so artistic and poetic a writer as Flato at once discarded the style

## VIII. TEXT

to which he had been accustomed from childhood to his twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year in favour of an official novelty.

The Attic inscriptions of the period contained in the *Corpus Graecarum Inscriptionum* are almost exclusively legislative or magisterial decrees and public accounts. In such documents the second person naturally is not used, and there is no evidence of any such change as that of  $\phi\omicron\beta\epsilon\iota$  to  $\phi\omicron\beta\eta$ . In the accounts  $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$  the aorist only occurs, so that there is no evidence in favour of the change to  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ .

On this subject it may be well to quote an incidental remark of the author of the *New Phrynichus*, who will not be thought too conservative in the matter of orthography. Mr. Rutherford writes (p. 45): 'It is no rare experience to find the most distinguished critics advocating an alteration of all the manuscripts, simply because they have never tried to estimate, as is done in this inquiry, the extraordinary ease with which an Athenian of the best age moved among the various coexistent literary dialects of his time.'